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Typically, the available tools for redistribution are p-ice subsidies --
which in their extreme form are in-kind transfers-- and direct cash transfers.
Conventional  economic  theory  indicates  that  the  efficiency  loss  of  a
redistributive policy is minimized if cash transfers are used instead of price
subsidies.  However, evidence shows  that in almost all economies, including the
more advanced ones, the implementation of price subsidies as a  redistributive
policy, is prevalent.  That is to say, the seemingly more efficient form of
redistribution, cash transfers, is little used.
Using a  welfarist approach, this  paper  claims that  the rationale  behind the
policy  choice  is the existence  of consumption  externalities:  The  taxpayer
obtains a  certain level  of enjoyment  out of the  consumption package of the poorer
fellow  citizens, rather than of the general level of the utility of those poorer
groups.  The objective of this paper is to identify the condicions under which
price subsidies represent a more efficient  way of alleviating poverty than cash
payments, given paternalistic  preferences of taxpayers.  The development of this
topic entails three stages:
1.  To establish a conceptual framework for a comparative evaluation of
altruistic behavior and paternalistic behavior.  The conceptual framework
uses  a  private  utility  function  for the  taxpayer  that  characterizes
preferences  for  redistribution  to  the  poor,  under  the  alternative
assumptions of altruistic and paternalistic taxpayer preferences.- 2 -
2.  To find a  systematic explanation to justify seemingly inefficient
redistributive policies.  We  seek this explanation  by  identifying the
utility gains that could justify the efficiency cost resulting from the
use of poverty alleviation schemes such as price subsidies, rather than
lump-sum transfers to the poor.
3.  To make policy recommendations by specifying mechanisms  for more
efficient subsidization of the poor at the existing level of expenditure
or on  how  poverty alleviation  schemes could  be optimally  sxpanded  or
contracted.
II.  CONCEPTUAL  FOUNDATION
A.  Introduction
An individual has extended preferences  when his welfare depends in  any way
upon the welfare of others.  Extended preferences may be expressed in the form
of interdependent utilities with either a subset of the community or the entire
remainder of the community.
Interdependetncy  of utilities can be either benevolent or malevolent  in
nature.  Within this context, a benevolent  (malevolent) individual's welfare
increases  as  a  result  of  increases  (decreases)  in other  people's  welfare.
Benevolent interdependency  of  utilities, which is  tis  primary focus  of this  work,
could be utility-related (altruism),  or commodity-related (paternalism).-3-
B.  Altruiss
the altruistic individual enjoys any increase in the welfare of others
regardless of the source of  that increase. An increases in  the welfare of others
becomeq a positive externality to the altruist.  Consequently, the altruist is
willing to make direct income transfers in order to increase the utility level
of others, regardless of the way in  which the recipients make their allocation
decisiona.  The altruist does not impose  his altruistic consumption preferences;
he ignores the tastes of others.
This altruistic behavior  means that the utility level of others enters the
utility function of the altruist as an argument.  This requires that the aocial
preference ordering of the altruistic individual be weakly separable, i.e.:
ry  =  Ul(u  (X) , up(x  )]  where  au>  (1)
aup
and a and 6 are two representative individuals; a is an altruist.
C.  Paternalism
The  paternalistic  individual  is  concerned  about  the  fellow  citizens'
consumption level of particular goods  (e.g., food, housing, education) rather
than being concerned about their general eccnomic welfare.  Increases in  other's
consumption of those goods become a positive externality to the paternaiistic
individual.  The  paternalistic  individual  has  a  preference  for  certain
consumption pattern of others, and not  the preference ordering of the recipient.
The  paternalistic  individual's  preference  ordering  function  is  not  weakly
separable because at least one element of the individual  utility function of one
agent appears as an argument in  the  utility function  of at least one other agent:-4-
u'  = u"(x  ,xp)  where  -u'  > 0  (2) a  xp
The  paternalistic individual,  concerned  about consumption  by others, might
be better-off by undertaking unilateral in-kind transfers to ensure that others
do in fact consume the goods in question.'-' These transfers would be Pareto
improving because both parties would be better-off  as a result.  Since the
paternalistic agent is placing an additional "value" to that particular good,
relative to the value given by others, his willingness to pay for that good is
relatively larger than that of others.
The above argument is the foundation of our analysis.  For efficiency to
prevail under paternalistic interdependence of utilities, the supporting price
system  would require different prices for different individuals together with a
policing  system, or  direct provision  by  the  state. 2-'  This  pricing  policy
prescription is  theoretically  grounded in  the Pigovian  tax/subsidy solution:  In
the presence  of  external effects,  and  given  the appropriate  convexity conditions,
a  Pareto efficient allocation  of resources can  be achieved  by taxes/subsidies on
the commodities generating external effects.  If we equate the ratio of each
individual's marginal utility for the externality producing good to the price
ratio of that good faced  by each individual,  the result is not necessarily equal
to one.  For instance, in the case of two consumers, where one consumer creates
a positive externality, the price ratio that yields a Pareto efficient solution
'-  Or equivalently, the rich may want to subsidize the price of those goods
in order to encourage their consumption.
2_  Most likely, intervention  by  the state or  a control  system will be required
in order to avoid the "free  rider" problem and to ensure that the targeted group
is reached as prescribed by the policy.-5-
could be derived as:
p. / pa  Au /axp  la3)
au  lax"
The consumer enjoying the externality must face a higher price than the
consumer producing the consumption ei-ternality  for Pareto efficiency.  This is
the basic argument for subsidizing the price of the pertinent good.
It  seems reasonable  to think, therefore, that subsidizing  the externality-
producing good is the right thing to do under paternalism.  However, subsidieE
increase the real income of the recipient3 and reduce the real income of the
taxpayers.  Changes in  real income  would possibly affect  the  willingness to work.
Hence,  the  effect  of  subsidies  on  each  agent's  labor  decision,  and  the
acceptability of this decision to other agents  must be considered in  order to be
able to  assess the overall outcome of the policy, an important part of the
analysis which will be addressed later.
D.  The Utility Possibility Function
The potential efficiency improvement stemming from paternalistic through
subsidies, can  be evaluated by  the utility  possibility  function or  utility
possibility frontier.  This function, which relates the utility levels of two
representative individuals, determines the maximum utility an  individual can
attain  given the  utility  attained by  the other  individual,  in  view of  the
technological constraint imposed  by the social transformation function.  In the-6-
presence of two-way external effects in consumption, 3-' it can be shown that the
slope of this function id defined as:
au"  ax,  dx  (4)
au-  au 0
-up
The above  expresEion shows  that the utility possibility function can slope
upwards, i.e. the expression takes a positive sign if the external effects are
positive and  greater than the internal effect.  In  all  the positions in  which the
frontier has a positive slope, there is room for welfare enhancement.  Welfare
gains from redistribution are possible.  Everyone can still be made better-off
by moving along the upward sloping  portion of the utility possibility frontier,
until  it changes  to  a downward  sloping segment.  These movements  would  be
accomplished by increased consumption of the externality-producing good by the
individual whose consumption produces the externality.
If we assume that external effects occur only "one-way", the slope of the
utility possibility frontier becomes:
du  a  u,a
au=  ax,  ax"  (5)
au  au
This is the case considered in this analysis  --  the rich (a)  benefit from
the consumption of one, or more goods by the poor (6), but not vice-versa.
3-/  If  the  only  two  agents  in  the  economy  benefit  from  each  other's
consumption.-7-
III.  THE  ANAL 1ITICAL  MODEL
A.  Objective
As explained at the  beginning of this  paper, cur  objective is  to derive the
conditions under  which  it is correct to prescribe price  subsidies  and cash
transfers as redistributive policies.  The discussion and analysis will focus  on
the  assumption  of extended  preferences associated  with paternalism.  However, for
comparative evaluation, the analytical results  for botL types  of benevolent
behavior are derived.  The treatment of altruism is relatively brief since it is
well known that under altruism, direct cash transfer is the best redistributive
formula to reach an efficient equilibrium.'-'
B.  Description
In  our  model ind-viduals  are  divided into  two classes,  the rich (taxpayers)
and the poor  (subsidy recipients), differentiated by their human capital as
reflected  in their  wage  rates.  We  take  one  individual  of  each  class  as
representative of that class.  The postulate of the model is that paternalism
exists in the economy.  The rich derive utility when the poor consume certain
good(s).  This consumption by the poor represents a positive externality to the
rich.  The rich are also self-interested in the sense that they derive utility
from their own consumption and leisure.
4_!  The treatment of altruism is relatively brief since it is well known that
under altruism, direct cash  transfers is  the  best  redistributive formula  to  reach
to an efficient equilibrium.In terms of utility function specification, the utility £unction of the
paternaliEtic rich includes as arguments the consumption and leisure levels of
the poor, as well as his own consumption and leisure Xovels.  The poor, on the
other hand, only obtain utility from their own consumption of goods and leisure.
The preference for owr.  consumption need not differ among classes, so we niy
assume that both t'  rich and the poor face the same indifference curve for own
consumption.
The  presence  of  paternalistic  behavior  justifies  that  the  individual
producing  the  consumption  externality  should  pay  a  lower  price  for  the
externality-producing good than the price paid by the individual enjoying the
externality.  The paternalistic individual  is therefore  willing to subsidize  take
price of that good to the recipient.  This price differential i.,p  ies that the
set-up  of  the  paternalistic  model  does  not  correspond  to  a  competitive
equilibrium.  The "first-order"  conditions are  violated in this case.  The price
ratio is not equal to the marginal rate of substituticn of each  individual.
Hence, prices faced by individuals for the same goods differ from those that
would prevail in competition.
Paternalistic behavior of the rich however, does not deter the poor from
reducing hours of labor.  Reduction in hours of labor by the poor as a response
to a redistributive scheme; or..work  disincentive effect, is seen by the rich as
a negative exte..iality  because the rich dislike the increase in poor's leisure
per se, and because they also dislike the resulting reduction in output in the
economy. k4his disutility effect to the rich is explicitly taken into account in
the model  hy incorporating ,  a  poor's labor decision into the rich's preferenceordering.  The  in.Iusior of the  labor decision of the poor  into the rich's
utility  means  that  the  rich  want  sure  that  the  poor  do  not  reduce  their
dibposable income for other goods as result of making the externality good more
affordable.
In our model there is a government that represents all individuals in tha
economy  and determines  the  approprie':e  type  and  level of redistribution  --
subsidies or cash transfers --referring to a Social Welfare Function (SWF)  with
a capacity for making  interpersonal comparisons.  This  function is a social
ordering of th; Bergsor type, with total welfare measured as a weighted average
of the individuals' private utilities.  The social weights are chosen by the
government according to its value judgement on redistribution.  The government
chooses the value of social weights based cn its concern for each group in the
society, as well as on the number of people in each group.
C.  Methodology
We start  our analysis  with the  development of  the paternalistic  model.  For
illustr-ative  purposes, we continue our analysis with a simple derivation of the
results fcr the altruistic model in order to enable uB  to cornpare  the results
with  the  outcome of  the  different assumptions  made under the  paternalistic model.
The paternalistic model is developed in ascending order of complexity as
we progressively develop more relationslhips  within it:
1.  We first refer to a unique bundle of goods for all consumers.  We
assume a purely redistributive tax system  where the rich  pay taxes for  the- 10  -
exact amount of  the subsidy bill  required  for the poor to  consume an
amour.t  of that unique bundle, satisfactory to the rich.  The bundle of
goods is, therefore, priced differently for the rich (market price) and
for the poor (subsidized  price).
2.  We repeat the exercise using cash transfers rather than subsidies
and compare the results.
3.  The altruistic model is developed and both redistributive policies
are applied to ths model.
4.  In order to allow for substitution among goods, we drop the one-
bundle assumption and consider  only two goods in the economy of which both
rich and poor consume.  One of these goods is the externality-producing
good and, hence, it is subsidized.  The other good is a market good for
both consumer types.  Under this case we analyze two possibilities: if
only the poor consume the subsidized good at subsidi.ed prices, i.e. if
there  is perfect  targeting; and  if  also the  rich have  access to  the
subsidized prices, i.e. if the subsidy system suffers leakages to other
groups different from the poor.
5.  Beyond this point we do not add more  complexity to the model  in
order to preserve tractability of results, a point we discuss in more
detail  later.  Instead, we  suggest  some  possible  extensions  to  the
an&lysis, and speculate on the likely results that might arise, based on
our own experimentation with the model.- 11  -
D.  Assumptions of the Model
The assumptions  and specification  of  our  model apply  equally to  both policy
prescriptions- price subsidies and cash transfers:
1.  The preferences of the  individuals can be written by a strictly
quasi-concave  utility  function  increasing  in  consumption  goods  and
decreasing in own hours of labor.
2.  The model  is short-term in nature, with  fixed prices and wages,
fixed technology, and fixed capital stock.
3.  In order to maintain analytical tractability, the analyBis follows
a  partial  equilibrium  approach where  many  economic  relationships  and
markets are held  constant.  We choose  this tactic rather than a computable
general equilibrium (CGE)  framework because the additional information  we
would obtain using  a CGE model  in this  ax.alysis  does  not justify  its
complexity.  We are however, using a linear production technology with
constant  returns  to  scale,  which  implicitly  assumes  labor  markets
clearance, as explained in the next paragraph.
4.  Since the capital stock is fixed, changes in output occur through
changes in labor supply alone.  Labor is supplied by the poor and by the
rich.  Marginal productivity of the rich is higher than that of the poor,
and so is their wage rate.  From the point of view of production, goods
can be produced by substituting between labor input classes.  We assume a
simple linear production  technology, i.e.  constant returns to scale.  This- 12 -
implies'-':
Y  =  rK  + wPL 0 + wrLr  =  Cp  +  Cr  (6)
where  Y  =  total output
r  =  rental  rate
K  = capital stock
wP  = fixed wage rate for the poor
Lv  = hours of labor supplied by the poor
wr  =  fixed  wage  rate  for the  rich.
L'  = hours of labor supplied by the rich
CO  = consumption level of the poor
CT  =  consumption level of the rich
5.  The  marginal utility that the rich  derive from  their own consumption
is larger than the marginal utility they derive from the consumption by
the poor. i.e 6U r/6C t > 6Ur/5Cr.  This is to avoid the situation where the
rich are willing to let the poor consume so much, that the rich become
poor themselves.
6.  The  marginal  utility  to  the  rich  of  the  poor's  consumption  is
decreasing in that good, i.e. 6 2U'/6 2Cp  < 0.  This way, as the poor become
better-off, the rich reduce their concern for the poor.
7.  For equilibrium to exist, the total utility of the rich must be
Since  with  a  linear production  function the  marginal  product  of  the
factor always equals its cost, the assumption of linear production technology
makes our model closer to a general equilibrium model.  Labor market clearance
is implicit in the marginal product relationship, in this special case of a
linear production function.- 13 -
greater than the total utility of the poor.  That way the rich do not have
an incentive to  ecome poor.
8.  Preferences are identical  within groups or classes  in  order to avoid
pair-wise  comparisons  between  individuals,  but  there  are  asymmetric
preferences among groups, at least in terms of the preferences for other
people's consumption  of  the  externality good  in question.  Identical
preferences  for  own  consumption  among  groups  may  be  assumed  for
simplicity, without affecting our results.
9.  Our economy consists of three decision makers: the poor, the rich,
and  the  government.  Each  agent  sequentially  solves  his  optimization
problem as outlined in the next section.
10.  Taxation is purely redistributive.  The amount paid by the rich in
taxes is the exact amount received in subsidies by the poor.
E.  Solution Technique
Two possible  solution techniques could be  considered for solving  this
problem.  We  call them  Benevolent Dictator,  and  StackeJberg Game  solutions
respectively.
Benevolent  Dictator:  The  problem  could  be  seen  as  a  simultaneous
optimization problem where a benevolent dictator type of government maximizes a
social welfare function as a weighted average of the private utility functions
of each class  of individuals, subject to the individual  budget constraints.  The
social weights are chosen by the government according to its value judgement- 14 -
about  redistribution.  The  solution  to  the  government's  problem  is  the
consumption  demand  function and  the  labor supply  function of  each  type  of
individual, as functions of wages, prices, and the social weights.
Stackelberg Game:  Alternatively, we could consider  the problem  as an
asynmmetric  Stackelberg game, where we sequentially solve a partial equilibrium
problem for each decision maker.  First, the poor take the level of subsidy and
other parameters as given and decide on their optimum consumption and leisure
levels.  This  decision  directly  affects  the  rich's  utility  level.  The
paternalistic rich play as a Stackelberg leader, explicitly taking the poor's
decisions on consumption and leisure into  their optimization problem as reaction
functions. Constrained by their  own  budget and  by society's  production function,
the rich decide on their own optimum consumption and leisure levels.  Finally,
the  government  takes  the  above  individual decisions,  includes  them  in  its
unconstrained 6-' social welfare  function, and solves for the optimum level of
subsidies or transfers.
The choice between these two solution  techniques is  based fundamentally in
our own belief of the nature of reality.  Each of the above techniques gives us
different results.  The first technique (benevolent  dictator) is  a simultaneous
optimization problem involving the feed-back reactions of each decision maker.
The government chooees a level  of subsidy and all agents in the economy react to
it.  The  reactions  of  each  individual  are  already  incorporated  in  the
6_J  Since the government takes the solution arrived at by each individual,
it  is  optimizing  the  SWF  subject  to  the  constrained  optimization  of  the
individual agents.- 15 -
simultaneous solution.  It  does not allow for individual adjustments by the rich
of their labor and consumption decision once they find out how the poor behaved
when facing a certain level of subsidy.
The  Stackelberg technique is  a sequential  optimization  problem.  Each agent
reacts to the solution previously found  by another agent.  The technique allows
for the more powerful decision maker  (the rich), to observe those individuals
(the poor), whose behavior may affect theirs, and to react accordingly.  The
poor, on the other hand, respond independently, i.e  non-strategically to changes
in policy.
Based on our belief about how things work in reality, the Stackelberg
technique  seems  more  compelling  to  be  used  in  the  analysis  that  follows.
Generally, it would seem that taxpayers (the  rich) want to see their assistance
to the poor used for maintaining a minimal level of consumption and labor.  If
these levels are not reached to the rich's satisfaction, and in particular, if
work by the poor is reduced as a response to a poverty alleviation scheme, the
rich are powerful enough and sufficiently  well organized to reduce the level of
assistance to the poor.
F.  Development of the Model: PATERNALISM WITH PRICE SUBSIDIES
(ONE-BUNDLE  CASE)
We  first  develop  the  case  of  iDaternalism.  In  order  to  verify  the
preferability  of  the  policy  chosen,  the  problem  is  analyzed  under  both
redistributive  schemes:  price subsidies,  and  cash  transfers.  We  keep the
assumption of paternalism in  both cases in  order to compare the preferability of- 16 -
one policy over the other.  For illustrative purposes we then proceed with the
case of altruism.
1.  The Problem of the Poor:  The poor take the level of subsidy, prices
and  wages as  given, and decide  upon  their optimal consumption  and leisure levels.
They supply  hours of labor and  generate  their utility by consumption  of goods and
leisure.  Their budget constraint is determined by their labor income alone.
Under this case we are assuming a unique good'- for the rich and for the poor.
The poor face a subsidized  price for  that good.  Normalizing for prices, we take
wages and subsidies as real values.  The poor's private utility function and
budget constraint are;
Max UP = UP (CP,LP)  (7)
C'. LI
s.t.  wPLP  - (1-s)C  P  (8)
where:  CO  = consumption level of the poor
LO  = hours of labor supplied by the poor
wP  =  fixed wage rates for the poor
s  = price sabsidy
Assuming that the equilibrium  is interior, we can write the  solution to the
problem as a function of the exogenous components of the optimization problem.
The solution of the poor's problem is their consumption demand and labor supply
We  may  think of  a unique good  as a composite good  involving  a large
range of goods.- 17
as functions of wages and subsidies:
CPI  =  CP(WP,  s)  Reaction  (9)
L  P =  LP(wP  s)  Functions
where *  represents equilibrium values.
2.  The Problem of the Rich:  Facing prices and  wagee, the rich maximize
a utility function that includes their own consumption and leisure levels, and
explicitly incorporate  their preference towards consumption by the poor, as  welil
as their  dislike  of the  poor's  leisure.  They explicitly  take  the optimna)
decision  (reaction functions) on consumption by the poor  into their utility
function as parameters, not as an additional decision variable8-':
Max  Ur = Ur(C  ,L ,CF,LCP)  (L0)
C',  L'
where:  Cr  =  consumption level of the rich
LT  =  hours of labor supplied by the rich
The rich's budget constraint is determined by the excess of total output, Y,
after the wages of the poor and subsidy bills are deducted.
Y  - (w  PLP  +  sCP)  =  C r  (11)
The above constraint implicitly assumes equilibrium in the goods market, i.e.,
that the output available in the economy is totally consumed.
We can therefore express the rich's budget constraint as:
8_!  The externality effect that the consumption and labor levels of the poor
produce  in the economy,  shows up  in the government  problem when the  social.
welfare function is optimized.- 18  -
w rLr  +  rK  =  Cr  +  sCP*  (12)
where  wr = fixed  wage  rate  for the  rich.
The solution of the rich's problem is their consumption demand and labor supply
as functions of the exogenous components, wages of the rich and of the poor, and
subsidies:
C  C r(w r,wP,  s)  (13)
L  r.  =L  r(  wr,  w P,  s)  (14)
3.  The Problem of the Government:  The government's role is  to maximize
social welfare.  As an outcome of its maximization behavior, the government
improves efficiency in the allocation of resources.  The government constructs
a Social Welfare Function (SWF) as a weighted  sum  of the individual utilities.
It  incorporates  the individual  preferences of  the rich and  the poor into its  SWF.
It then estimates the optimum level of redistribution, and enforces it 9-'.  The
SWF would have the following form:
Max  SWF  =  W =  n  Vr(Cr.,Lr.,CP',LP.)  + (1-n)  VP(CP',LP)  (15)
where n,  (0  o  s  n  1)  determines how much weight the government gives to the
preferences of the rich.
9J/  At  this  point  individuals  have  already  solved  their  private  utility
problem.  Hence,  the  individual  utility  levels  to  be  included  by  the
government when setting up its optimization problem  is the  indirect utility
function, V --the maximum utility level achievable by individuals.  The values
for consumption and labor to be substituted in equation (15) are those optimum
values that each individual chose when the individua_ problem was solved.- 19  -
Substituting equations (7) and (J0) into (15) and differentiating we get:
dW  d[f Vr(C  r,,Lr  , C P')  +  (1  -n)  V  P(CP,L)]  =O0  (16)
7d-5  - ds
dW  - r  fVr dCr  avrdLr  aVr  dCP+aVr  dLP1(  _l)  F81aVPdCP-aVPdLP=o  (17)
T.  -Cds-  TL7  a  is  aCP  Us-  Lp  -d  acP d  E_PT
The third term in the first bracket on the right-hand-side of equation (17) is
the value of the consumption externality.  It represents the gain in utility of
the  rich by  increased consumption  by the  poor that  results  from a  subsidy
increase.  The next term to the right represents the loss of utility to the rich
of reducing hours of labor by the poor as - result of a subsidy increase.
The  maximization uf the SWF  takes into  account  the decisions that the other
two agents have previously made concerning consumption and  labor, which  are
themselves functions of wages and the subsidy level (equations 9, 13, and 14).
Applying equation (17)  to our  model in  specific form  we can solve for  the optimum
subsidy value expressed in terms of the exogenous parameters.  An application of
the model to a standard Cobb-Douglas model is presented immediately after the
complete development of the model in its general form.
4.  Comparative Statics: Once  the  equilibrium  values for  consumption  and
leisure for  the poor and for the rich are established, and the equilibrium level
of subsidies have been obtained, the full system is totally differentiated, in
order to analyze the general equilibrium effect on our solution of any change in
the policy parameters.- 20 -
The  variabies  of the  system  are:
Endogenous  variables:  W,  UP, U,  CP, Cr, LP, L.
Exogenous  variables:  wP, wr,  a, r, K, Q.
The  complete  system  of equations  is:
W -nu  - (1-n) UP =  0  (18)
Ur  _  ur(Cr,L  r,CP,LP)  =  0  (19)
UP-  UP(CP,LP)  =  0  (20)
c5  _  Cr(Wr,WP,S)  =o  (21)
CP  - CP(wP,s)  =  0  (22)
Lr  _L  r(wr,  wP  s,  rK)  = °  (23)
LP - L P(wP,s) =  0  (24)
and  totally  differentiating  the  complete  system:
dW  - U rdn - Q dUr-(l-Q)dUP+UPdn  =  (
dU r  - U  r  dC  -UrL.  dLr  - Ur.  dCP-UrL,  dL P  0  (19')
dU P - UPO dCP  - UPL, dLP =  0  (20')
dC  r  - Crw  dwr-Crwp  dwP  - CrS  ds  -dr-dK  0  (21')
dCP  - CPW dwP-  CPs  ds  =  0  (22')
dL  r  - Lrw  dwr-LrWP  dwP  - Lrsds  -dr--dK  =  0  (23')
dL  P - L Pw, dwP  - LPsds  -0  (24')- 21 -
Solving for dW/ds:
E  =  C P  [ (-n  )uPC,  + n  uIC,j
+ nSU  'C  C'5  +  UrL. L-  L  (25)
+L%  [(  l-rii)  UPL,  +n u IL,]
The change in welfare due to a change in subsidy may be broken down into three
effects:
i.  The change in social welfare due to a change in consumption by
the poor after a subsidy change, as it affects both utilities of the
rich and of the poor (first row of equation 25.)
ii.  The change in  welfare due to a changes in  the utility of the rich
derived by their own decisions on consumption and on leisure, after a
change in subsidies (second row of equation 25.)
iii.  The change in  welfare due to a change in labor supply  by the poor
as a response to a subsidy change, as it affects the utilities of the
rich and of the poor (last  row of equation 25.)
It is difficult to determine a priori the overall sign of dW/ds.  Several
opposing factors are at work in this expression.  First, since the total subsidy
bill, sC",  represents a lump-sum tax to the rich, only a pure income effect occurs
to  them.  Therefore,  the  rich's  labor supply  response  to  a  price  subsidy  is
unambiguously positive.  Second, to the poor, the price subsidy behaves  like an
indirect tax  in the sense that changes  relative prices,  hence both  income and
substitution effects in consumption and leisure, are present.  Third, if the net
effect  on  the  poor's  labor  supply  is  negative,  the  rich  suffer  a  negative- 22 -
externality.  The  total effect  on social welfare  will  depend  on  the  relative
intensity of each individual effect.
5.  The Optimal Subsidy:  Equating equation (25) to zero we solve for the
optimum level  of subsidy.  We replace the marginal utilities of consumption and the
marginal disutilities of labor with their equilibrium values in terms of prices,
subsidies, and wages.  The value for the utility of the rich of labor by the poor
is  more difficult to determine.  Let us assume that to the rich, every hour  the poor
increase leisure as a response to a subsidy scheme, represents a loss in welfare to
the rich.  This loss to the rich of ail  additional hour of leisure by the poor is
valued by  the rich at certain constant  k >  0,  embodying the dislike of the resulting
loss of output, together with the dislike of the poor's leisure per se.  The value
of k would range according to the intensity  with which the rich dislike the poor to
increase their leisure.  It may be assumed to lay between zero and the marginal
productivity of the poor's labor as measured by their wage rate, wP ,  i.e.  0 <  k
<  wp.  These boundaries suggest that the paternalistic rich would consider a loss
of some  positive value but not greater than the value  of output that the  poor failed
to produce by increasing leisure.
The equilibrium values of the marginal utilities of consumption and of leisure for
both agents in our model would be:
Ur.  =  1  (competition  price)
U=  S  (subsidy  level)
UPC,  (1-s)  (after-subsidy  price)UrL.  - wr  (wage  rate  of  the  rich)
UPL,'  wP  (wage  rate  of  the  poor)
UrL,  =  k  (constant  dislike  value)
and substituting them into equation (25), it becomes:
W-  cP  -n  s  +  Ql  S  3+ Q  +  SI  +  n  (+  l  ) wP +n  k] =  0  (26)
solving for s':
C2  =  Cn  c+  w  rLrS  +  kLP5 ]  + (1  -n)  (CPs+  wPLPs]  (27)
(1  -2Q)C  Ps
Equation (27) provides us with the optimuni  level of subsidy.
The above results help us identify some of the key parameters that deserve
empirical  estimation.  Subsidie3  will  be  determined  by  the  elasticities  of
consumption and leisure of both rich and poor to changes in subsidies, and by the
exogenous variables of the model, includinq nQ.  It is eUident that we need to know
more about the relevant elasticities of consumption demand and labor supply, to
changes in  subsidies (i.e.  prices).  Using  explicit utility functions,  we can  derive
the pertinent  parameters  to  arrive at  an expression  for  the optimum  level of
subsidy.  The application to a specific model --the Cobb-Douglas, will allow us to
analyze conditions and results arising from the assumption of paternalism.  We
develop this application in the next section.
6.  Cobb-Douglas Application:  Applying our model to Cobb-Douglas utility
functions the problem to be solved becomes:- 24  -
The  poor:
Max  lnUP  = a,lnCP  +  a,Iln(l-LP)
C1,L  (28)
s.t.  wPLP =  (1-s)CP
The  rich:
Max  lnUr=  b 1 lnCr  + b,ln(l-L(r)  +  b3 CP  + b 4 lnLP
C',L  (29)
s.t.  wrLr+  rK-  SCp  = Cr
Using  the  same  solution  technique  explained  above,  we  obtain  the  relevant
consumption demand, labor supply,  and their corresponding elasticities for  both the
poor and for the rich.  They are respectively:
CO.  awPI  acpK  a'u  >C  (30)
a 1 ~~~~~~~~~~~~C(31)
(1-s)(a,+a2)  ds  (1-s)2(a~+a2)
Lp.  a,  aLP =  O  (31)
a,  +a  2
Cr.  =  b1 wcr+,P  acr  a1b1 wp  >0  (32)
b2 +  b  (a,  +a2) (b,  +b 2)  (T-s)  (  +a 2)  (b1 +b 2)  (1S_)
2
Lr  =  b,  aAbwps  aL r  aAbwP  b33)
Lr  bi  5-  +  _12a,  12(,  bwr(-S2>
I +  2  (al+a 2)(b 1 +b2)wr(1s) 2 )
In the Cobb-Douglas case the poor's labor supply is fixed.  The intuition behind
this result is based on the hypothesis that at low levels of consumption there is
little or  no  substitutability between  consumption  and  leisure.  Consequently,
subsidies do not affect the labor supply  of the poor.  They increase consumption as- 25 -
a response to a subsidy increase.  To the rich an increase in the subsidy level
represents a direct income reduction because it is a lump-sum tax determined only
by  the  quantity  of the  ubsidized good  demanded  by the  poor.  It  is a  purely
redistributive form of tax.  The rich give up some of their own consumption as a
response to this tax.  They also increase their labor supply.  The "first-order"
conditions of our Cobb-Douglas specification of the problem tell us that the rich
are willing to make transfers to subsidize the poor's consumption up to the point
where the margindl utility of paying for the poor is equal to the marginal utility
of keeping income for their own consumption.
7.  Paternalism with Cash Transfers:  The next step involves the analysis
of the model when the policy consists  of direct cash transfers, T, from the rich to
the poor,  rather than transfers  delivered in  the form  of price subsidies.  We retain
our assumption  of paternalistic behavior.  Therefore, we use utility functions, and
a social welfare function similar to the functions used under the price subsidy
scheme.  What differs under this case is the way in which the scheme affects the
budget constraint of the poor.  This step requires a reformulation of the budget
constraints as follows:
For  the  poor:  (34)
wPLP+T  =  CP()
For the rich:
w rL  rr-T  =  (35)
The "first-order" conditions of the problem in ceneral form would tell us that the
rich would make transfers to the poor up to the point  where the marginal utility of
transferring income to the poor is equal to the marginal utility of keeping it for
their own consumption.  Following the same solution procedure used in the subsidy- 26 -
case, we totally differentiate the system and solve for the optimum level of cash
transfers which we obtain as:
Q(C  T  +  wrLrT  +  kLPT]+  (1-  Q) ICPT+ WPLPT]  (36)
sZ  C  PT
This is the marginal cash transfers that would have to take place in order for the
poor  to  consume the  externality  good  at  a  level that  is  satisfactory  to the
paternalistic rich.
8.  Subsidies vs.  Cash  Transfers  in  General  Form:  In order to find the
conditions under which the subsidy would be less expensive than cash transfers to
obtain  the  same  consumption result,  we  compare the  above  expression  for  cash
transfers (equation 36) with the optimum subsidy obtained in equation  (27).  The
following condition is derived:
5'  CP  <  T  CD=
flfCrS +  WrLrs + kLPs]+(l-)E[CPs+  WPLPS1CPT <  (1-2)  (37)
n  C'T  +  wrLrT  +  kLPT]+  (l-n)(CPT+  WPLPT]Cps  n
The change in poor's labor supply as a response to a subsidy change --  the labor
elasticity of subsidy-- is zero for the  Cobb-Douglas case, and lower  than the labor
elasticity of cash transfers.  This _s because in the former, the substitution
effect would have an off-setting effect to the income effect, while in the latter,
no substitution effect exists.  The same argument applies to the elasticity of
consumption.  Therefore,  the  numerator  of  equation  (37)  is  lower  than  the
denominator and  we can say that the left-hand side of equation (37) is less than
one.  This means that the right-hand side must be greater or equal to one in order- 27 -
for subsidies to be a less expensive policy for the economy:
(l-2fi)  2 1
(38)
1Ž  3f2  ------ *
The above condition tells us  what the value of n  should  be for subsidies to be less
expensive.  If for the government the weight of the preferences of the rich is at
least 33.3 percent of the total, it is cheaper for the economy to redistribute by
using subsidies rather than by using transfers.  The more important the rich are to
the government (the  higher n  is),  the more attractive subsidies  are relative to cash
transfers.  As paternalism losses  weight, i.e., as n  decreases below 1/3, the more
important the preferences of the poor become, and hence, the more important cash
transfers become.  This  particular result takes  us into  the political economy aspect
of the level of Q:  Whether or not a high value for n,  which would give a larger
social weight to the rich, would penalize the poor even further and a distributive
policy does not result in an increase in happiness of the poor as high as it  would
be potentially feasible with the same cost to the economy, i.e cash transfers.
For the Cobb-Douglas model with cash transfers the model becomes:
The  Poor
Max  UP =a  log  CP  +  a 2 log(I-Lp)
C1.Ls  1(39)
S.t.  wPLP+T  =  CP
p  a,wP  - a 2T  aLP  a2  <  O  141)
(a,  +a  2)  W,  OT  (a.  +a)wP- 28  -
The  Rich
Max Ur  =  b,  logCr  + b,  log(1-L r)  + b3 log(I-CP)  +  (b4)  logLP
C,,L  - (42)
S.t. wrL r  +  rK  - T =C r
Cr.  1 w  i;ar-  - b  I2  <  0  (43)
(b 1 +b2)  ;  Ir  ,  <  (4)
Lr.=  b2 T+blwr  OLr  b2 >o  (44)
(b1 +b2) Wr  dT  wr(b,  +b2)
9.  Subsidies vs Cash Transfers in the Cobb-Douglas Model:  We intend to
find  conditions  under  which  the  underlying  redistribution  method  is  output-
increasing  for  the economy as a  whole.  Considering  a  partial equilibrium framework,
for redistribution to be output-increasing, it is necessary that the increase in
output resulting from an increase in the labor supply of the rich, be larger than
the decrease in output, if any, resulting from the decrease in the labor supply of
the poor, or:
r  >  -paLP  For subsidies  (45)
ra  >  wp_LP  For cash  transfers  (46)
Using the labor  elasticity results obtained  under subsidies (equation  33) and under
cash  transfer  (equation  44)  and  substituting  them  into  equations  (45)  and  (46)  we
get the conditions under which each scheme is output-increasing.  For the case of
subsidies we get:- 29  -
ai b2wP  >O  (47)
(1-S)
2 (a,  +a 2 )  (b,  +b,)  wr
Price subsidies  would be  output-increasing if  the above  result holds.  Observing the
above expression we can establish that the condition is  easily met since all values
on the left-hand side of equation (48)  are positive.  This result is not surprising
for the Cobb-Douglas case.  We already knew that the poor do not reduce their labor
supply as a response to a subsidy while the rich increase theirs.
For the case of cash transfers we have:
b2 >  a,  (48)
IT7F2  a]  +a2
Standard consumer theory tells us that leisure is a normal good.  The share of
leisure in  the  utility function increases  with income.  Therefore we  may assume  that
a 2 --the share of leisure in the utility of the poor, is lower than b 2 --  the share
of leisure in the utility of the rich.  We also know that the rich have two more
components i-  their  utility function  than  the  poor, namely the levels of  consumption
and leisure  by the poor.  Hence we may safely assume that (a,  +  a.)  is larger than
(b, +  b 2)  and  conclude  that  the  condition  in  equation  (48)  is  satisfied.
Consequently, the application of cash transfers as a redistributive scheme und r
paternalism  is undoubtedly  output-increasing.  Therefore  we cannot  reject cash
transfers as a scheme beneficial to the economy.  What we have to find out now is
whether the improvement arising from a cash transfers scheme is better than the
improvement obtained with subsidies, since we have already found when it is less
costly for the economy to use each scheme.  We attempt to answer this question by
comparing our equations (45) and (46) in Table 1:- 30 -
TABLE 1
Subsidies vs Cash Transfers in the Cobb-Douglas model
Subsidies  Cash transfers
a,  b2 wP  >  0  (45)  a2 (46)
(1-s)2 (a,  +a2)  (b  +b2)  wr  B  a,  +a2
a1 b,wP  >  0  (47)  (a,+a 2 )b2 - (b,  +b2)  1 > 0  (48)
(a,  +a2)  (b1 +b2)
(al  +a 2)b2 - (b, 1 b 2)a,  >  0  (49)
b2al  >  a2bi  - a  b>  (50)
Contrasting the labor  response of the rich and the poor to changes in subsidies and
to changes in  cash transfers and simplifying  expression (45)  we arrive at equations
(47)  and (50) in the table.  We can be certain that equation (47)  holds easily.  In
comparison, equation (50) states that the ratio of the utility coefficient of the
poor  must  be  larger  than  that  of  the  rich.  This  condition  would  not  hold
unambiguously  despite  the  assumptions about the  values of  the parameters  made
previously.  Thus we may conclude that from  the point of view of total output, using
subsidies  for redistribution  is a  less limited policv when  preferences of  the
taxpayers  are vresent,  i.e. the conditions under which either policy is output- 31  -
increasing, are more easily met when using subsidies than using cash transfers.
10.  Altruism:  As  defined  at  the  introduction  of  this  chapter,  the
altruistic individual is concerned about the utility of others but not about the
precise composition of their preferences.  By accepting the utility function of
others, their marginal rate of substitution between goods is also being accepted.
The conditions for  competitive equilibrium are preserved and  the solution is Pareto
efficient.  The  preferences  of the  rich  are  separable  from  their  altruistic
preferences  for the poor when the rich take them into account in their utility
function.  The specification of the problem would be:
For the Poor:
Max UP  =  UP  ( CP,  LP)  (51)
C', LI
s.t.  wPLP  =  (l-s)C  P  (52)
For the Rich:
Max  Ur =  Ur(C  r,Lr, UP(CPf,LP)  (53)
C-, L,
s.t.  wrLr  + r.K  =  Cr  +  SCp  (54)
The optimum level of subsidy under altruism is:
5_(W PL Psn  - sP)+ l(WPLPFn  -Cpr  -4(CPrn) (nCpr+nwr  R  (-O)wPLPs)  (5 *  (w~~~~~L~~s~~~c~~sL)±  (  S  (55)
2CP 81n- 32 -
The optimum level of cash transfers under altruism is:
=n[CT  +  wrLrT ]+ (1-Q)[CPT+ wPLPT]  (56)
n  (CPT+  WPL  PT)
Comparing the expression for transfers  (equation 56), with the one obtained for
paternalism (equation 36) we can see that the required transfers are higher under
paternalism  than  under  altruism.  The  subsidy  numerator  is  smaller  and  its
denominator is larger.  The difference is that under paternalism, with unchanged
price  ratios,  the poor  would use  their  transfer  for purchasing  that  level of
consumption of the externality good satisfactory to the rich.  But it also means,
by the income effect, higher consumpticn ot other goods in which the rich have no
interest.  In order to have the poor obtain a certain level of consumption without
changing the  price ratio,  it is necessary  to make  a  sufficiently  high  income
transfer  to  ensure that  level of  consumption,  and at the  same time  allow  for
consumption of other goods and (possibly) leisure.
On the other hand, under altruism, since what matters is  that the poor attain
a higher indifference  curve, a higher level  of  utility  may be  obtained by increasing
consumption of all goods available to the poor.  The existence for the poor of a
wider  range  of options  for  increasing their welfare  is what  makes  altruistic
behavior more efficieant. This is  because it is  easier to raise the general utility
of an individual when he/she is  allowed to increase leisure and  general consumption
for that purpose, than if any negative labor response by the poor, or increased
consumption of other goods, is not valued by the rich.- 33  -
G.  PATERNALISM WITH  SUBSIDIES  (TWO-GOODS CASE)
In  order to allow for inter-good  substitution, the next stage of our exercise
involves  the expansion in  the number of goods.  Instead  of considering one good, we
will consider two goods, of which both rich and poor may consume.  One of the goods
is the externality or merit good, C.  It is the preference of the rich that the
poor  should consume at  least some of that good.  Since it  is the  externality
producing good, it is subsidized.  The market price of this good  is p, =  1 for
normalization purposes.  The other good is a  market good with price p 2 equal for  all
agents.
Under the two-good case we analyze two possible ways in which the subsidy
system is  administered: i) if only the poor have  access to the subsidized price for
that good, while the rich pay the market price i.e. if the administration of the
subsidy system is perfectly targeted to the poor; and ii) if there is no specific
targeting to the poor of the subsidy system so that the rich have access to that
good at the subsidized prices, i.e. if the subsidy delivery system suffers from
leakages and subsidized goods are offered to all groups.
We proceed  to  the development  of  the application  of our  model  for both
redistributive policies, subsidies and cash transfers to the two-good case.
The statement of the two-good case problem would be:
For the Poor:
Max  UP  =  UP (CP,ICP 2 ,LP)  (57)
C',  L'- 34 -
For the Rich:
Max  ur =  Ur(Cr11Cr2,Lr, CP,LP
C, Li
If subsidies are targeted only to the poor the budget constraint for the rich is:
s.t.  wrLr + rK =  Cr  +  sCP-  (60')
If subsidies "leak" to the rich the budget constraint for the rich is:
s.t.  wrLr  +  rK  =  SC r  +  sCp  (60')
The  resulting  subsidy  level  for  perfect  targeting  and  for  no-targeting  are
respectively:
For perfect targeting:
(1-n)  [CP1 S+wPLPS+P 2 CP, 8] +n(  WrLr +P2Cr  ,+  Cris+  kLPS]  (61)
(1  -2n)CPI 8
For no targeting (leakages)
1(l-S)  [CP18+wPLP  +P 2 CP 1 S]+ n2  [WrLrS+P
2 Cr 2s+Cr  +  kLPsJ
s Is  s  2  ~~~~~~~is  S  (62) .s - ~~~(1-2ni)CP,,-QCr,
where:
CPis  = Marginal consumption  by the  poor of  good 1 ,  the  subsidized good
Cris  =  Marginal consumption  by the  rich of  good 1 ,  the  subsidized good
(at  subsidized  prices if  no targeting;  at  market prices otherwise)
CP2S  = Marginal consumption  by the  poor of  good 2 ,  the  market good
Cr2S  =  Marginal consumption  by the  rich  of good  2 ,  the  market good
p2 =  price of the market good.- 35 -
We cannot tell a priori how the administration of the subsidy system affects
the value of the subsidy.  Since relative prices for the rich change when their
consumption is subsidized, the  marginal propensity to consume  by the rich and their
labor elasticity is certainly different with and without a price subsidy on their
own ccnsumption.  The marginal propensity to consume would be higher and probably
even positive.  The response of labor supply would be lower.  However, it would be
reasonable  to  assume  that  the  above  two  effects  cancel  each  other,  at  least
partially.  And also that the increased subsidy enjoyed by the rich is exactly
matched by increased taxes.  Equations  (61) and  (62) would still differ by the
denominator.  The difference rests in the presence in the denominator of equation
(62)  of the marginal consumption by the rich of the externality good as a response
to a subsidy  change.  In  the Cobb-Douglas case  we saw that  this marginal consumption
is negative.  In that case, when there is  perfect targeting, the subsidy level is
higher than when there are leakages of the subsidy  program to the rich.  The higher
unit cost of the  subsidy represents the cost to the economy of having a price
distortion that is not justified or compensated by an externality producing agent,
since the poor do not behave paternalistically towards the rich.
The optimum level of cash transfer for the two-goods case is:
(l-P) (CPiT+wPLPT+P 2 CP,T]+Q  [wrLrT+p
2 Cr2 T+  Cr  T+  kLPT]
n  CpiT
We assume that under this system  of cash transfers the  only recipients are  the poor.
TABLE  2  summarizes the most  important general  form expressions  for each
redistributive policy under different assumptions of the behavior of the rich.TABLE  2
SUBSIDY  vs.  CASH  TRANSFER  UNDER  DIFFERENT  TAXPAYERS'S  BEHAVIORAL  ASSUMPTIONS
Subsidy  Cash-Transfer
Altruism  - One  Bundle
. (wPLPSn-cpS)-l(wPLPflP-cp)2-4(CPgQ)(QCPS+DwrLRS+(l-a)WPLPS)  .=  QC'T  + wrrT  I+  (1-n)I)[CPT+  WPLPT
2cPs  an  (CPT+ WPL  PT)
Paternaliss  - One  Bundle
. [ Cr'  + wrLrs  +  kLPSJ+(l-n)ICP.+  WPLPs,  . ClCrT  +  wjLrT  + kLPTI+  (l-fl)ICPT+  WPLPT]
(l-20)CPs  n  CPT
Paternalism  - Two  Good  - Perfect  Targeting
(1-0)[CP.s+wPLPs+P 2 CP.s]+PvrLrs+p
2 Crs+  cr 1S+  kLPsI  . (1-fl)(CPIT+WPLPT+P 2CPITJfltwrLrT+P
2 Cr2 T+  Cr1 T+ kLPT]
(I -2n)CP,s  n2 CPLT
Paternalism  - Two  Goods  - Subsidy  Leakages
. (1-n)[CP,,+wPLPs+P 2CP,sI  +  nIwrLr  +p2Cr  +cr5 I+  kLPs  T  (Ii-)ICPIr+WPLPT+P 2CPT ] +,  nwrLrT  +p2Cr 2T+ Cr  T+ kLPT)
(l-20)CP,s-gCr,S  n  cP  T
(same  as above)- 36  -
IV.  EXTENSIONS  TO  THE  MODEL
In  order to  obtain  additional information  from  our  model, further  complexity
could be added to it.  For instance, because of the partial equilibrium nature of
our model, the analysis in  this paper does not consider indirect  effects that could
arise, via effects of poverty alleviation schemes, on conditions in other markets.
For instance, our model assumes fixed wages in the short run.  If we allow for
flexibility of  wages of  the two labor  markets --  the rich's and poor's,  the exercise
would require a  more exact specification of the production function of each type of
good  (externality and market good), and allow for substitution among the three
factors inputs: two kinds of labor and capital.
with the ab,ve extension we would keep the assumption of maximization of
profits by the firms with respect to the employment of labor holding capital fixed
in the short run.  However, constant return to scale would not necessarily hold.
The respective  marginal rates  of productivity  would  determine the factor  prices  that
would directly affect the budget constraints of both the rich and the poor.  Demand
for labor would be described by the "first-order" conditions of maximization of
profits, i.e. firms equate the marginal product of labor to the real wage.
However, only under very special conditions would  inclusion of the labor
markets result in levels of consumption by the poor opposite to what was intended
by the policy  (i.e. a reduction  in consumption by the poor of the externality
producing good is a result of a subsidy increase).  That would be the case if the
poor  are mainly  employed  in the production  of  goods  with  a  very  high  income
elasticity of demand, consumed  mainly by the rich.  An increase in  taxes  will reduce
demand by the rich of the income-elastic  good.  Demand for labor from that industry- 37 -
could be curtailed, with a consequent reduction in nominal wages for the poor.  If
the subsidies or cash transfers fail to compensate for the wage loss of the poor,
an  increase  in  the  level  of  redistribution  would  ultimately  reduce  total
consumption, including consumption of the subsidized good.
Our concern about the validity of our results when wages are endogenous led
Us  to experiment the "supply side"  effect  of subsidies  with our model.  We attempted
to include specific production functions for each type of good using the three
available factors of production.  The experiment resulted in loss of tractability
as the model became far too complex for a feasible analytical solution.  The model
grew  significantly  in the  number of  variables  and  results  were  impossible to
interpret.  Instead, we will  analyze  the properties  of  the more  simple model
numerically through simulations and empirical estimation in later research.
The other question we would like  to consider is the total cost to the economy
of each redistribution scheme.  That is, how much is the total tax in both cases
that needs to be collected in  order to bring all agents in  the economy to an  optimum
level of satisfaction.  For this particular questLon more specific information on
the value of the parameters would be required in order to assess the full response
of each agent to tax/subsidy changes.  With some empirical estimation or/and use of
existing estimites we would attempt to answer this question at a later stage.
V.  CONCLUSIONS
The  results  obtained  here  are  quite  appealing  from the  economic  policy
perspective.  Our  results  provide  the  economic  conditions  under  which  price
subsidies and cash transfers may each be considered more effective and efficient- 38 -
redistributive tools.  The conclusions  arrived at  under each of the  problems stated
above, could be broadly summarized as follows:  When paternalism is the prevalent
behavior of the taxpayers, and taxpayers have a higher weight in society, i.e. a
higher n,  the option for redistribution should be to target price subsidies to the
poor.  This  option would bring about  a greater improvement in  overall social  welfare
and "happier"  taxpayers than  with any  other policy.  With this solution  the poor are
somewhat better-off,  but they would  rather receive cash  transfers at the  same
financial cost to the economy.  When the rich is typically altruistic there is  no
distortion in the price system.  The preferences of each individual are preserved
and the  best  redistributive  policy  for  the  economy  as  a whole,  and  for each
individual agent, is the use of cash transfers.  Increasing the number of goods,
or  allowing the rich to enjoy  subsidized prices do  not affect  our qualitative
results.  Only  the  size of  the  optimum  scheme to  be  used  under  the  various
circumstances would change.- 39 -
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